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Abstract—Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols rely on voting mech-
anisms to reach consensus on the current state. If an enhanced
majority of staking nodes, also called validators, agree on a
proposed block, then this block is appended to the blockchain.
Yet, these protocols remain vulnerable to faults caused by
validators who abstain either accidentally or maliciously.
To protect against such faults while retaining the PoS selection
and reward allocation schemes, we study weighted voting in
validator committees. We formalize the block creation process
and introduce validators’ voting profiles which we update by a
multiplicative weights algorithm relative to validators’ voting be-
havior and aggregate blockchain rewards. Using this framework,
we leverage weighted majority voting rules that optimize collective
decision making to show, both numerically and analytically, that
the consensus mechanism is more robust if validators’ votes are
appropriately scaled. We raise potential issues and limitations of
weighted voting in trustless, decentralized networks and relate
our results to the design of current PoS protocols.
Index Terms—Proof of Stake, Consensus, Weighted Voting,
Multiplicative Weights Update
I. INTRODUCTION
In Proof of Work (PoW) or Nakamoto consensus [35], a
single miner claims the right to append the next block to
the blockchain after solving a secure cryptographic puzzle.
The strengths and vulnerabilities of this mechanism have been
studied and understood, see [23]–[25] and [22], [28], [43]. Two
fundamental properties satisfied by PoW are the following:
(i) Miners holding p% of computational power will create
on average p% of blocks that will be part of the blockchain
assuming that all miners follow the protocol. This property
relies on the randomness of the cryptographic puzzle and
ensures fairness in the allocation of mining rewards [38], [39].
(ii) Miners can be selected as the next block creators only
when they actually create and submit the block to the network.
This property says that the random selection of the next block
creator and the creation of the next block occur simultaneously.
Proof of Stake (PoS) or virtual mining protocols [14] consti-
tute alternative selection mechanisms that aim to retain PoW’s
benefits while improving on its weaknesses [11], [15]. While
different PoS protocols propose different schemes [12], [17],
[26], [29], [31], [40], in general, the block proposal mechanism
is the following: blocks are created by staking nodes, also
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called validators [32], [41], who are granted the right to
participate in the block creation process by locking capital
in protocol currency, called stake. Subsequently, a pseudo-
random mechanism selects nodes proportionally to their stake
to form committees that will decide on the validity of a
block proposed by a selected node, called block proposer or
leader. At the core of the consensus mechanism, the selected
validators cast approval or disapproval votes on the proposed
block. If an enhanced majority of approval votes, usually 2/3
of the committee size [33], is reached, then the proposed block
is accepted and appended to the blockchain.
However, maliciously or accidentally abstaining validators
can cause consensus failures and stall the blockchain1. The
reason is, that unlike Nakamoto consensus [46], PoS protocols
decouple the selection of block creator(s) from the actual block
creation and hence do not satisfy property (ii) above. Since
consensus on the “valid” state of the blockchain relies on the
voting behavior of all participating validators, this also implies
that the actual rate of blocks that a validator gets to create may
differ from the times that she gets selected in a committee.
Hence, while the PoS selection mechanism aims to ensure fair
allocation of “mining” rewards in line with PoW’s property
(i) above, in practice, it may fail to do so. These observations
motivate the following question
How can we improve the efficiency and robustness of the
consensus mechanism, i.e., how can we use information
on validators’ past voting patterns to enforce that with
overwhelming probability the selected validator commit-
tees will reach consensus on the “valid” state of the
blockchain.
The problem of improving consensus has been treated in the
context of fixed-size committee voting by a rich stream of
literature [10], [36], [37], [44], [49]. The derived solutions
hinge on quantifying voters’ abilities to make correct decisions
and apply weighted voting rules in which votes are weighted
according to voters’ profiles. Our goal is to apply these results
in the setting of PoS protocols. The link is immediate, since, as
[10] remarks, the assumptions of their original model imply
both decentralized information processing and limited com-
munication. The additional challenges that have to be treated
in the blockchain context, concern updating these profiles and
protecting against their manipulation by adversaries.
1Malicious absention refers to non-voting or incorrect voting to attack the
protocol, whereas accidental abstention refers to a variety of reasons, such
as dropping offline, experiencing network latency, bugs in client updates or
being a victim of a censoring/eclipse attack.
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To address this problem, we formulate the proper mathe-
matical framework and develop a model to quantify validators’
voting profiles. The proposed scheme is applied once voting
committees have formed and does not modify the underlying
PoS selection and reward mechanisms. Each staking node
(validator) is assigned a score based on her so-far contribution
to protocol execution. When selected to a committee, her vote
is weighted relative to her profile and consensus is decided
according to a weighted majority rule that maximizes the ex-
pected collective rewards [10], [44]. Finally, based on her vote
and the overall consensus outcome, her voting profile is revised
according to a fully parametrisable multiplicative weights
update algorithm [2], [8]. Supported by numerical examples
and simulations, our findings demonstrate that weighted voting
renders the consensus mechanism more efficient, even if more
than 1/3 of nodes are not properly voting. In this way,
the proposed scheme restores fairness without compromising
other PoS features. Additionally, since it does not modify the
underlying PoS mechanism, it can be tested, implemented and
reverted with minimal cost to existing protocol users.
Although weighted voting in distributed systems is known
to increase efficiency, incentive compatibility [4], [6], and
network reliability [7], it also raises additional risks [3], [48],
[51]. Similar to proof of reputation systems [50], weighted vot-
ing deviates from the principle one node – one vote and hence,
is vulnerable to manipulation by adversaries. We raise issues
that pertain to weighted voting such as loss of anonymity &
centralisation and discuss their relevance to protocol design
and implementation. Weighted voting becomes particularly
relevant in less anonymous [30], private or permissioned
blockchains [1], [45], [47], in delegated PoS protocols [27],
[34] and in PoS protocols with low targeted number of staking
pools [16].
A. Outline
In Section II, we abstract the PoS consensus mechanism
as a voting game. In Section III, we design the improved
voting scheme and illustrate our findings with numerical
examples and simulations. We conclude with a discussion
about limitations and implementation issues in Section IV and
summarise our findings in Section V.
II. THE MODEL
Our terminology is based on the Ethereum 2.0 PoS protocol
specification, [17]. Yet, our model remains as general as
possible in an effort to capture similar voting mechanisms
implemented by related PoS platforms2.
Time: Time is divided into time slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } of
fixed duration d. Each time slot is dedicated to the proposal
and creation of a new block Bt. Time slot t0 is the time of
creation of the genesis block B0.
2Claiming that all PoS protocols fit under this model would be oversimpli-
fying and wrong. Yet, most PoS protocols that we are aware of involve voting
mechanisms and hence, may benefit – to a larger or lesser extent – from the
present proposal. An incomplete list includes [12], [26], [29], [31], [40]. For
more extensive details of PoS protocols, we refer to [9], [15], [19], [21].
Validators: The main actors in the block proposal and cre-
ation mechanism are the staking nodes, also called validators,
denoted by i ∈ I , where I ⊆ N is the set of all validators. Bi,t
will denote the set of blocks for which validator i is aware of
at time t ≥ 0.
Stake: The deposit or stake is the amount of the underlying
cryptocurrency that a potential validator locks as Proof of
Stake (PoS) to participate in the block creation process. Such
deposits may change over time. Accordingly, let vi,t ≥ 0
denote the stake of validator i ∈ I and vt :=
∑
i∈I vi,t the
total stake at time slot t ∈ N. If vi,t > 0, then validator i is
called active at time slot t. Validators who have withdrawn
from I or who have not entered it yet, can be thought of
as validators with stake vi,t = 0. Thus, although the set of
validators is dynamic, we may write I instead of It to denote
the set of validators at any time t ≥ 0,
Block proposer & committees: To create blocks and extend
the blockchain, active validators are selected proportionally
to their stake by a pseudo-random mechanism which assigns
to each time slot t a leader or block proposer and a fixed-
sized committee Nt = {1, 2, . . . , n} of validators3. The block
proposer is assigned the task to propose a block Bt to
the committee. In turn, the committee votes on whether the
proposed block should be appended to the blockchain or not.
This process constitutes the core of the consensus mechanism
and will be the focus of the present paper.
Validators’ strategies: The set of strategies of a validator
who has been selected in a committee will be denoted by S =
{−1, 1}, where −1 stands for rejecting and 1 for approving
the proposed block. In particular, −1 also corresponds to not
casting a vote, either deliberately or accidentally. Accordingly,
let Xi,t denote the indicator random variable
Xi,t =

1, if validator i voted on the approval of the
proposed block Bt in time slot t
−1, otherwise
We will write xt := (x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xn,t) ∈ {−1, 1}n to deno-
te the decision or action profile of the committee at time t ≥ 0.
Decision rule: A decision rule f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, also
called social choice function or aggregation of preferences
rule, is a function that receives as input the action profile
xt and outputs a decision in {−1, 1}, where −1 and 1
stand for dissaproval and approval of the proposed block,
respectively. We will focus on (simple or enhanced) majority
rules fq, q ∈ [0.5, 1] defined by
fq (xt) :=
{
1, if
∑n
i=1 xi,t ≥ (2q − 1)n,
−1, otherwise (1)
If at least q ∈ [0.5, 1] of the selected validators approve the
proposed block, then this block is appended to the blockchain.
3The mechanics of the pseudo-random mechanism vary between different
protocols. Here, we are not interested in risks associated with manipulating
this mechanism and focus on the mechanics of the voting process once a
random committee has been formed.
Otherwise, the time slot remains empty and the mechanism
progresses to the next time slot.
If block proposers follow the protocol and do not behave ma-
liciously, then all proposed blocks are valid. Moreover, if the
network is not partitioned and network latency is insignificant
(lower than the time slot duration during which votes are
expected to appear), then there is no controversy about which
blocks are valid, since all validators view essentially the same
blockchain (state), i.e. Bi,t := B for all i ∈ I, t ≥ 0. Under
these conditions, the required majority should be reached and
valid blocks should be regularly approved and appended [26],
[40]. However, in practice, two main reasons may lead to
failures on the consensus mechanism
• adversarial behavior: a malicious node may abstain from
voting or censor other validators’ votes to block the required
majority and stall the block creation process.
• accidental behavior: validators may drop offline accidentally
or due to negligence, they may experience bugs on client
updates, bad network connectivity, their votes may not
propagate through the network in the expected time slot or
they may be victim themselves of a censoring/eclipse attack.
Our goal is to study how existing results on optimizing
aggregation of preferences in committees, in particular [10],
[36], [44] can be applied to the PoS blockchain setting and
improve the underlying consensus mechanism. The application
of these results will be immediate once we have defined the
proper framework.
III. AN IMPROVED VOTING RULE
To optimize the consensus process from an aggregative
perspective, we quantify the collective benefits and losses
(payoffs) from correct and wrong decisions respectively. This
is done in Table I. The benefit from making a correct decision,
Proposed Block Bt
Valid (1) Invalid (-1)
Committee Approve 1 −`a
Reject −`r 1
TABLE I
COLLECTIVE WELFARE FROM CONSENSUS OUTCOME.
i.e., approving a valid block or rejecting an invalid block, is
scaled to 1. Here, −1 denotes an invalid and 1 a valid block Bt,
cf. Section IV. If a valid block is rejected, then a loss of `r > 0
is incurred which corresponds to the waste of computational
resources and the failure of the system to process pending
transactions. On the other hand, if validators vote for an invalid
block, then `a > 0 represents the losses from validating a
conflicting history4. Determining the exact values of `r and `a
is a matter of protocol parametrisation. Finally, let α ∈ (0, 1)
4This may include approval votes for a block that a malicious node is trying
to create in order to double-spend or perform some other kind of attack. It
may also involve votes that get wasted on blocks that will be subsequently
reverted or abandonded.
denote the prior probability that a proposed block is invalid,
e.g., blocks that an adversarial is trying to create.
Given the above, we seek to maximize the expected col-
lective welfare Et at time slot t > 0. Et depends on the
probabilities of accepting a valid block and of rejecting an
invalid block under the decision rule fq ,
pi1 (fq) := P (fq (Xt) = 1 | Bt = 1)
and pi−1 (fq) := P (fq (Xt) = −1 | Bt = −1), respectively.
Using this notation,
Et (fq) = (1− α) (1 + `r)pi1 (fq) + α (1 + `a)pi−1 (fq)
To estimate pi1 (fq) and pi−1 (fq), and hence, to maximize
Et, we need to reason about the decision rule fq and par-
ticularly, about the distribution of the decision variables Xi,t.
Fortunately, this can be done by retrieving existing information
about validators’ past votes that have been stored as messages
on the blockchain. This is captured by the notion of validators’
voting profiles.
Voting profiles: Each validator i ∈ I is assigned a score
pi,t ∈ [0, 1] that corresponds to their voting profile at the start
of time slot t. The value pi,t can be thought of as validator i’s
decision ability or probability that i will vote correctly, i.e.,
pi,t := P (Xi,t = 1 | Bt = 1) = P (Xi,t = −1 | Bt = −1)
for i ∈ I, t ≥ 0. In its simplest form, pi,t is equal to the
fraction of validators i’s correct votes to the number of slots
in {0, 1, . . . , t − 1} that i was selected in a committee. This
expression is only given to provide some intuition and in what
follows, we will examine a different scheme that depends on
the collective welfare of the consensus outcome, Table I.
Initializing & suspending profiles: We will set a newly en-
tering validator i’s voting profile at pi,0 := 0.5 and will require
that pi,t ∈ [0.5, 1), for any t ≥ g, where g ≥ 1 denotes
an initial grace period. If pi,t < 0.5, for some t ≥ g, then
validator i will be suspended from I . The reasoning behind
these choices is detailed in Section IV.
Updating scheme: In general, an updating scheme is given
by a function h : [0, 1] × {−1, 1} → [0, 1] which revises
validator i’s voting profile after time slot t based on i’s prior
voting profile pi,t, the correctness of her voting decision xi,t
and the current state Bt, i.e.,
pi,t+1 = h (pi,t, xi,t,Bt)
for t > 0. The current state Bt may include all relevant
information, such as the collective welfare parameters, cf.
Table I, the validity of the proposed block and the consensus
outcome. If a validator i ∈ I has not be selected for slot t,
then simply pi,t+1 = pi,t. A concrete updating scheme that
fits in this description is developed in Section III.
We now return to the problem of maximizing the collec-
tive welfare Et. For a selected validator committee N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} at time slot t, we may condition on the vector of
validators’ voting profiles pt = (p1,t, p2,t, . . . , pn,t) and write
the probability pi1 (fq | pt) of approving a correct block with
the decision rule fq as
pi1 (fq | pt) =
∑
xt:fq(xt)=1
 ∏
i:xi,t=1
pi,t
∏
j:xj,t=−1
(1− pj,t)

and similarly for pi0 (fq | pt). The expression for pi1 (fq | pt)
is derived as follows: The summation ranges over all action
profiles xt for which the decision rule fq approves the
proposed block. The double product inside the parenthesis
is precisely the likelihood of each of these profiles based
on the assumption that validators’ decisions are independent.
Specifically, the first product ranges over all validators i ∈ I
who vote correctly, i.e., i : xi,t = 1, and multiplies each one’s
probability of a correct vote, i.e., pi,t, and the second ranges
over the remaining validators j ∈ I who vote incorrectly, i.e.,
j : xj,t = −1, and multiplies each one’s probability of voting
incorrectly, i.e., 1−pj,t. Given these expressions, the problem
of maximizing Et (fq) can now be studied as an instant of the
committee-voting models in [10] and [36], [44].
Example 1 ([44]). Consider a committee of 5 validators with
voting profiles, i.e., empirical probabilities of voting correctly,
p = (0.9, 0.9, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6), as in [44]. In the unweighted case,
or equivalently in the case in which all votes are weighted
equally, and under the 2/3-majority decision rule f2/3 that is
commonly used in PoS protocols, the probability of reaching
consensus on the correct block is equal to the probability that
at least 4 out of the 5 validators vote correctly. This is
0.920.63 + 2 · 0.63 (0.9) (0.1) + 3 · 0.920.62 (0.4) ≈ 0.56
which is lower even than the lowest voting profile of 0.6. A
naive improvement would be to only consider the vote of the
validator with the highest voting profile, i.e., of either the first
or the second validator. This would increase the probability of
correct voting to 0.9, however at a toll on decentralisation.
In the naive improvement of the previous example, the vote
of the best validator received a weight of 1 and the vote of all
others a weight of 0. This raises the question of whether we
can assign non-trivial weights (scale factors) to all validators
and still improve the probability of a correct decision. The
answer is affirmative and hinges on the notions of weighted
voting and weighted majority rules.
Weighted majority rule: For a set of n validators, let wt :=
(w1,t, w2,t, . . . , wn,t) denote a vector of non-negative weights
or scaling factors, with wt :=
∑n
i=1 wi,t. The weighted
majority rule, fq (w), or simply fq , is defined as
fq (xt) :=
{
1, if
∑n
i=1 wi,txi,t ≥ (2q − 1)wt,
0, otherwise
(2)
for q ∈ [0.5, 1]. If all votes are equally weighted, i.e., if wi,t =
1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, t > 0, then (2) reduces to (1).
Using this notation, our goal is to determine the weights wt
and the weighted majority rule fqˆt – or equivalently the quota
qˆt – that optimize the collective welfare Et given the selected
committee Nt of validators at time slot t, i.e.,
max
q,wt
{Et (fq, wt)} (3)
This is the statement of the following Theorem which is due
to [10] and in special instances due to [36], [44].
Theorem 2 (Optimal Weighted Voting Scheme, [10]). Con-
sider a committee Nt = {1, 2, . . . , n} of validators with voting
profiles pt = (pi,t, p2,t, . . . , pn,t) that have been selected to
vote on the proposed block in time slot t > 0. Then, given
α and the collective welfare parameters `a, `r in Table I, the
decision rule that maximizes the collective welfare, cf. (3), is
given by the weighted majority rule fqˆt , with quota
qˆt :=
1
2
[
1−
(
ln
(
1− α
α
)
+ ln
(
1 + `r
1 + `a
))
w−1t
]
(4)
and individual weights
wi,t := ln
(
pi,t
1− pi,t
)
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5)
Remark 3. According to Theorem 2, the optimal quota (4)
depends on the validators’ profiles and hence, it may vary
between different time slots t > 0. Also, it may vary according
to the values of the parameters α, `r, `a. For instance, the
selection α = 1/2 neutralizes the bias due to assumptions
on the distribution of valid versus invalid blocks whereas the
selection `r = `a neutralizes the bias due to differences in
perceived network costs/rewards. In this way, Theorem 2 max-
imises the collective welfare – or equivalently, the probability
of consensus on the correct decision – by an easily adaptable
and dynamic decision rule.
Yet, in blockchain applications, it may be desirable to
enforce certain restrictions, as for example that the required
weighted majority will be no less than 2/3 of the total weights
or that each individual weight will be no less than some
threshold value. As [44, p.332] explains, even in such cases of
additional restrictions and/or perturbed assumptions, selecting
weights that are proportional (or equal) to the optimal ones (5)
will improve the probability of a correct outcome compared
to unweighted decision making.
Example 1 (Continued). Assume for simplicity that α =
1/2 and that `r = `a. In this case, the optimal rule is
simple weighted majority, i.e., qˆ = 1/2, or by substitut-
ing in (2), fqˆ (x) = 1 if
∑n
i=1 wixi ≥ 0 (dependence
on t is omitted to simplify the notation). Using (5) and
normalizing the weights to sum up to 1, we obtain w =
(0.392, 0.392, 0.072, 0.072, 0.072). With these choices, the
probability of approving a valid block is approximately 0.927
as shown in Table II. The weighting has resulted in a voting
rule which approves a block if the two high-profile (0.9) val-
idators agree on its validity (first column of decision profiles).
The votes of the remaining validators come into play only if
these two disagree. In this case, it suffices that a majority (2 out
of 3) of the remaining validators approve the block (remaining
6 columns of decision profiles). The probabilities of decision
Profiles Weights Decision profiles x, with fqˆ (x) = 1.
0.9 0.392 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
0.9 0.392 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
0.6 0.072 -1,1 1 1 -1,1 1 1 -1,1
0.6 0.072 -1,1 1 -1,1 1 1 -1,1 1
0.6 0.072 -1,1 -1,1 1 1 -1,1 1 1∑5
i=1 wixi > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
TABLE II
profiles xt with fqˆt (xt) = 1 sum up to approximately 0.927
as claimed
0.92 +
(
2
1
)
0.9 · 0.1
((
3
3
)
0.63 +
(
3
2
)
0.62 · 0.4
)
≈ 0.927
The weights vt = (1/3, 1/3, 1/9, 1/9, 1/9) yield the same
result and are in that sense, equivalent to the optimal ones. In
fact, there may be several other optimal choices. As mentioned
above, if we impose additional restrictions such as a de facto
2/3-weighted majority, the weights given by (5) may not be
optimal anymore. However, as [44] remarks, they will still
yield an improved probability compared to the unscaled case.
In this example, a similar calculation as in Table II shows that
the probability of reaching the 2/3-majority is 0.81 with the
wt weights and approximately 0.85 with the vt weights.
A. Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm
We now turn to one of the main challenges of implementing
the voting profile scheme in the dynamic blockchain setting,
which is the update of voting profiles after every time slot.
The updating scheme may considerably vary depending on
Algorithm 1 Weighted Voting in Committees
1: procedure POS SELECTION((vi)i∈I ,B)
2: return N ← {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
3: return B (proposed block)
4: procedure COLLECT VOTES(N,B)
5: for i← 1, n do
6: if B == xi then (.)xi = i’s vote message
7: vote(i)← 1
8: else
9: vote(i)← −1
10: procedure WEIGHTED VOTING((pi)i∈N , (vote (i))i∈N )
11: for i← 1, n do
12: wi ← ln (pi)− ln (1− pi)
13: sum ← sum +wi·vote(i)
14: q = OPTIMAL QUOTA((wi)i∈N , α, `r, `a)
15: if sum ≥ 2q − 1 & B == 1 then
16: append.block(B)
17: B ← B ∪B
18: procedure POS REWARDS((vi)i∈N ,B)
the desired result: [50] propose a reputation system in which
reputation increases according to a sigmoid function when
nodes vote correctly and decreases sharply (to 0) after a
single violation. While this approach adheres to intuition and
comes with certain merits, practical applications may call for
more flexibility in the updates. To develop a parameterizable
scheme, we utilize the approach of [2] who generalize the
standard multiplicative weights update (MWU) algorithm to
a non-binary setting in which experts’ scores are revised
according to the impact of their decision on the social welfare.
Using Table I, the corresponding MWU algorithm for the
present application is given in Table III. Here, δ > 0 is a
Proposed Block Bt
Valid (1) Invalid (-1)
Committee Approve pi,t (1 + δ) pi,t (1− δ)
`a
Reject pi,t (1− δ)`r pi,t (1 + δ)
TABLE III
MULTIPLICATIVE WEIGHTS UPDATES.
(small) number subject to the exact protocol parametrisation.
Apart from the efficiency properties of the MWU algorithm
that are well known, see [2], [8] and references therein, this
scheme can leverage the prevailing network conditions and
adjust the updates accordingly. This can be realized by re-
placing δ and/or `r, `a with sequences of updating parameters,
(δt, `r,t, `a,t)t>0.
Algorithm 1 summarises the weighted voting procedure.
Validators are selected and rewarded according to the under-
lying PoS protocol (lines 1 and 18). The weighted voting
procedure5 is applied once the committee has been formed
(lines 10 to 17) without modifying the rest of the protocol.
In this way, it contributes towards a more efficient and
fair consensus mechanism while remaining decoupled from
the PoS selection mechanism. This results in a two-layered
scheme that on the one hand improves the efficiency of the
consensus mechanism and restores the fairness property of
the PoS protocol and on the other hand can be implemented
and reverted with minimal cost to the users. The proposed
scheme for updating validators’ voting profiles is given for
completeness in Algorithm 2. The max and min expressions
Algorithm 2 Validators’ Voting Profiles
1: procedure MWUPDATE(I, δ, `r, `a)
2: initialize: pi ← 0.5, t← 1
3: while t > 0 do
4: if pi < 0.5 & t ≥ g then (.) grace period g
5: i← ∅ (.) suspend validator i
6: else if vi ∈ N then
7: if Bt == xi,t then
8: pi ← min {1− , (1 + δ)} (.)  = 10−5
9: else if Bt == 1 then
10: pi ← max {0.5− , (1− δ)`r}
11: else
12: pi ← max {0.5− , (1− δ)`a}
13: t← t+ 1
(lines 8,10,12) ensure that the profiles remain in [0, 5, 1).
5The function that determines the optimal quota is given in a general form
(line 14) to account for implementations with a rule different from the one
proposed in (4), as e.g., a constant 2/3-majority rule.
B. Numerical results
Figure 1 provides an instantiation of the proposed weighted
voting scheme and MWU algorithm. In the illustrated scenario,
an adversary is blocking 40% of the votes. At the start of
the attack, all validators have a voting profile p = 0.9. We
examine two choices of the updating parameter δ = 10−3
(red) and δ = 2 × 10−3 (blue). In both cases, α = 1/2
and `r = 10−2, `a = 12 to capture the higher costs from
approvals of invalid blocks. The depicted curves indicate that
the weighted approval votes (vertical axis) rise above the
2/3 majority threshold6 for both cases. The pace is different
and depends on the selection of δ. The knicks in both lines
correspond to the point in which the scores of voting validators
numerically reach 1. After this point, the majority of the voting
validators increases at a very slow pace which is a desirable
property that allows for a more smooth recovery in case that
the abstaining 40% resume voting. As a comparison, Figure 2
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Fig. 1. Time slots to resuming consensus on valid blocks with 40% non-voting
nodes under mild (red line) and aggressive (blue line) updating parameter δ.
In both cases, `r = 10−2.
illustrates the process of resuming approval of blocks in the
same scenario but with an adversary controlling 50% of the
stake (left panel) and 60% of the stake (right panel). The
results indicate a very similar recovery pattern, cf. Figure 1,
independenlty of the initial stake of the non-voting validators.
The evolution of a validator’s voting profile is illustrated in
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Fig. 2. Time slots to resuming consensus on valid blocks with 50% (left
panel) and 60% (right panel) non-voting nodes under mild (red line) and
aggressive (blue line) updating parameter δ. In both cases, `r = 10−2.
Figure 3. In the depicted scenario, the validator’s initial profile
is 0.9. She votes correctly 80% of the time, but drops 10% of
6While the optimal quota, cf. (4), remains slightly above 1/2, we consider
the 2/3-majority rule which is currently implemented in PoS protocols.
the time off-line, and votes on invalid blocks another 10% of
the time. The exact formula for updating her profile is
pi,t+1 = min {1− 10−5,max {0.5, p˜i,t+1}}
where p˜i,t+1 is the value calculated by Table III. This formula
ensures that pi,t remains in [0.5, 1). Again, we examine two
cases for different values of the update parameter, δ = 2×10−2
(lefta panel) and δ = 10−2 (right panel). While the patterns
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Fig. 3. Evolution of a validator’s voting profile who periodically drops offline
and periodically votes on an invalid block for different values of parameter δ.
In both panels, the validator’s initial score is 0.9, `a = 12 and `r = 10−2.
differ, in both depicted panels the voting profile falls due to
the regular incorrect votes. We remark, that lower values of
`a would result in upwards sloping curves (not depicted here)
implying that a validator could regularly vote incorrectly and
still improve her voting profile. Similarly, higher values of δ
would allow validators to quickly recover their profiles after
pitfalls which is an undesirable property. The depicted patterns
in the evolution of the voting profile are robust in the choice
of the initial score and the value of `r.
Finally, Figure 4 extends the above scenarios to a period
in which the validator resumes proper voting. Specifically,
we assume that the validator votes correctly on every block
except of occasional time slots – less than 10% of the time –
in which she goes offline. Again, the two panels correspond
to different values of δ. In both cases, the pattern is linear
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Fig. 4. Recovery of the validator’s voting profile after resuming proper voting
(with only occasional offline-drops) in the scenarios of Figure 3. Recovery
exhibits linear pattern for both choices of δ. It is fast for δ = 2 × 10−2
(aggresive adjustment) and slow for δ = 10−3 (mild adjustments).
(the knicks correspond to the occasional drops) with a slope
that can be adjusted by the choice of δ. In sum, the provided
simulations support the versatility of the proposed scheme,
leaving the exact parametrisation (static or dynamic) subject
to each protocol’s implementation and scope.
IV. DESIGN & LIMITATIONS
The introduction of validators’ voting profiles and the
resulting improvement in the consensus mechanism come with
a trade-off in terms of security. Since the system becomes reli-
able on information that can be retrieved from the blockchain –
validators’ votes are stored as messages [18] – risks associated
with adversarial manipulation of this information are raised.
In the current section, we try to address these risks and discuss
relevant implementation issues and limitations.
Staking nodes & anonymity: Since nodes become identi-
fiable by their scores, anonymity is reduced or lost which
is at odds with the design philosophy of permissionless
blockchains. Yet, with blockchain governance yet to be deter-
mined, introducing less anonymity may be a desired feature.
Recent results point to a relative low desired number of staking
nodes [18] or stake pools [16]. In such schemes, reputation will
implicitly or explicitly influence protocol execution. Moreover,
stake pools retain anonymity at a user level, i.e., while the pool
becomes identifiable by its voting profile, the users remain
anonymous. In any case, the introduction of voting profiles and
weighted voting seems particularly relevant to permissioned or
private blockchains.
Defense against known attacks: Weighted voting improves
the resilience of the underlying PoS mechanism against the
following known vulnerabilities. First, adversaries who control
more than 1/3 of the total stake wield the power to stall (or
delay) the blockchain, see e.g. [26], [40]. To defend against
such attacks, current PoS proposals leverage the fact that
non-voting nodes can be identified and introduce penalties
to reduce their stake [5], [17]. However, these actions are
ineffectual against adversaries who can replenish their stake
and withstand the penalties. Although pessimistic, this sce-
nario – in which adversaries sustain an attack despite suffering
losses on their own stake – gains credence in the presence
of potential out-of-protocol profits. Second, PoS consensus
mechanisms are vulnerable to entering nodes that aim to attack
the protocol by flash or blindsiding attacks [13], [20]. Finally,
network issues – latency, bad connectivity – negligence, or
even censoring, can reduce the fraction of voting validators
below the required majority. The proposed weighted voting
scheme provides lines of defense (in an obvious way) against
these kinds of attacks or faults while retaining the benefits of
the underlying PoS design. In addition, the preserved reliance
on PoS for the selection of validators in committees and the
allocation of rewards, protects against adversarial nodes that
maintain small stake but high voting profile or vice versa.
Valid-invalid blocks & updating scheme: A likely con-
tentious assumption of the present model is that proposed
blocks can be indentified as valid or invalid. In practice,
different nodes may have different views of the blockchain
and hence perceive proposed block differently. Yet, on closer
inspection, this assumption can still be supported in the current
framework: if a node is honest but has a (completely) different
view of the canonical chain due to (say) poor connection to
the network, then her votes do not contribute to extending the
canonical chain and indeed can be regarded as incorrect. For
instance, in Ethereum, which is the base case for this paper,
valid–invalid votes are well-defined and identified [41], [42].
Dealing with this issue becomes more relevant in the design
of the updating scheme. Clearly, faults that can be identified as
deliberate should be treated differently than accidental ones.
For instance, a validator who has honestly participated in the
protocol for a long period of time and drops offline for a
short period of time, should be able to quickly recover her
previous voting profile. This motivates updating profiles by
two variables si,t and li,t representing short-term and long-
term voting respectively. In general, if the idea of weighted
voting gains support, then different methods should be tested
and analyzed in future research.
Computational overhead: While this issue is not treated
in the current study, storing and updating validators’ voting
profiles is not expected to add a significant overhead in the
protocol. The updating computations are linear in the number
of validators in a committee whereas the extra data storage is
limited to one additional value per validator. However, sim-
ilarly to testing different updating schemes (previous point),
computational issues should be addressed in future studies.
Entry & threshold voting profiles: The choice of initializing
voting profiles at 0.5 represents an uninformative prior on an
entering’s validators voting profile. Subsequently, the require-
ment that pi,t remains in [0.5, 1) for all t ≥ g, where g denotes
a potential initial grace period, enforces a more stable protocol
execution. While the reason for the upper bound is purely nu-
merical, namely to avoid the instability in ln (pi,t/ (1− pi,t))
if pi,t = 1, the suspension of validators with voting profile
– or probability of making a correct decision – lower than
0.5 is more fundamental. [10] provide a detailed probabilistic
argument to explain that such voters are harmful to consensus
and their votes should not be considered. Moreover, in the
specific context of distributed networks, allowing nodes to
participate with scores lower than their initial score can trigger
Sybil attacks, since it motivates switching to new or creating
multiple accounts. Finally, suspending validators in terms of
their voting behavior relaxes the need for frequent economic
penalties [18]. This makes the PoS ecosystem more secure and
appealing to investors who would otherwise be concerned of
suffering losses due to accidental misbehavior, e.g., dropping
off-line or being censored.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
Existing PoS protocols select staking nodes proportionally
to their stake to form block-creating committees. Yet, they do
not guarantee that selected committees will create blocks, since
consensus may fail due to accidental or adversarial behavior.
Thus, the perceived fairness in the distribution of rewards
in proportion to the stake of participating nodes is actually
violated. Motivated by this observation, we studied weighted
voting as a way to improve the consensus mechanism. We
introduced validators’ voting profiles – that quantify the prob-
ability that a validator will cast a correct vote based on her
so far contribution to the protocol – and defined the proper
mathematical framework to apply the results of [10] on optimal
decision rules in committee voting. Using the approach of [2],
we designed a multiplicative weights algorithm to update in-
dividual validator’s profiles according to their voting behavior,
the consensus outcome and collective blockchain welfare. The
result is a two-layered scheme in which selection of nodes and
allocation of rewards are performed by the underlying PoS
mechanism whereas blocks are decided by a weighted majority
voting rule. This scheme improves consensus within selected
committees by scaling votes according to validators’ profiles
without interfering with the PoS execution. Hence, it can be
tested, implemented and reverted with minimal cost to existing
users. On the negative side, the introduction of a profiling
scheme in a distributed network raises new risks associated
with manipulation of the relevant information. We discussed
such risks along with actions that should be considered in the
design of future PoS protocols.
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